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SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 - RULE MODIFICATION - TBE
NO-SALE RULE AND TBE PRIVILEGE TO AVOID
REGISTRATION
Securities Act Rule 133(a), 17 C.F.R. § 230.133(a) (1968),
as amended, SEC Securities Act Release No. 4892, 33
Fed. Reg. 566 (1968).
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has again
modified the once controversial "no-sale" rule.' The changes oper-
ate to relieve some previously existing restrictions in two ways.
' Securities Act Release No. 4892, 33 Fed. Reg. 566 (1968), amending SEC Rule
133(a), 17 C.F.R. § 230.133(a) (1968) [hereinafter referred to as rule 133]. This
rule, first adopted in 1951, SEC Securities Act Release No. 3420, 16 Fed. Reg. 8577
(1951), was a formal statement of a long standing administrative interpretation of the
terms "sale," "sell," "offer to sell," "offer for sale," and "offer" under the Securities
Act of 1933, § 2(3), 15 U.S.C. § 77(b)(3) (1964) [hereinafter cited as Securities Act].
The rule provided that, solely for the purposes of the registration requirements under
Securities Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77(e) (1964), no sale shall be deemed to have occurred,
so far as the shareholders in a corporation are concerned, where a less than unanimous
shareholder vote has the power, under the applicable State statute or the articles of in-
corporation, to cause a statutory merger or a transfer of one corporation's assets to a
second corporation in exchange for securities in the second corporation. The theory
that this is not a sale rests on the fact that some of the shareholders in the transferor
corporation may have opposed the transfer but are bound by it except to the extent that
such shareholders have a statutory right to appraisal of their holdings. A transfer bind-
ing a shareholder without his consent involves no meeting of the minds, so it is rea-
soned, and therefore, no contract or "sale" results. Some have argued that while this
rule may be very useful, practically speaking, the theory lacks logical rigor. See, e.g.,
1 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 521-23 (2d ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as L.
Loss].
The no-sale fiction was extensively abused as early as the 194 0's. See Hearings on
H.R. 4344 Before the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 77th Cong.,
1st Sess., pt. 3, at 845 (1941). See also 1 L. Loss 522 n.201. In 1956 the Securities
and Exchange Commission proposed to repeal rule 133 altogether, SEC Securities Act
Release No. 3698, 21 Fed. Reg. 7807 (1956), but after much public clamour, the SEC
adopted amendments to the rule, making old rule 133 new rule 133 (a) and adding
subsections (b) through (f) which limited the possibility of abusing the rule. Securities
Act Release No. 4115, 24 Fed. Reg. 5900 (1959). For an historical discussion of the
development of the no-sale theory, see 1 L. Loss 518-42. See also Sargent, A Review
of the "No-Sale" Theory of Rule 133, 13 Bus. LAW. 78 (1957); Note, The SEC's No-
Sale Rule and Exchanges Pursuant to Voluntary Reorganization, 67 HARv. L. REv.
1237 (1954).
2 That the new rule relieves restrictions was noted in a letter from Edmund H.
Worthy, Director, Division of Corporate Finance, SEC, to Case Western Reserve Law
Review, February 23, 1968. For this reason, according to Mr. Worthy, the Commis-
sion neither published notice of the proposed rule change nor held hearings thereon.
Rule 133 (a) now provides, with deleted words in brackets and added words in
italics:
(a) For purposes only of section 5 of the Act, no "sale," "offer," "offer to sell,'"
or "offer for sale" shall be deemed to be involved so far as the stockholders of a
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First, the old rule allowed a corporation to transfer its assets to an-
other corporation in exchange for securities in the transferee corpo-
ration or voting stock in the transferee's parent corporation.3 The
new rule allows the assets to be exchanged for securities of the trans-
feree or for securities of the transferee's parent. Second, under the
old rule, a parent corporation was one which was in control of the
corporation receiving the assets. "Control" was defined by reference
to the definition of control in section 368 (c) of the Internal Reve-
nue Code of 1954. In amending the rule, the Commission elimi-
nated reference to the Internal Revenue Code and, instead, inserted
the exact wording used in section 368 (c) to define control.
The provision that assets could be exchanged for voting stock
in the parent of a transferee corporation was not within the rule as
originally promulgated. That provision was added in 1954,4 be-
cause "ft]he Commission wished to bring Rule 133 in line with the
then newly adopted section 368 (a) (1) (C) of the Internal Reve-
nue Code of 1954 ... ."' Since the SEC did not follow the precise
wording of the Internal Revenue Code section defining control, thus
making rule 133 narrower than the Code in some aspects and
broader in others,6 this rationale is at best curious.7
corporation are concerned where, pursuant to statutory provisions in the state of
incorporation, there is submitted to the vote of such stockholders a plan or agree-
ment for a statutory merger or consolidation or reclassification of securities, or a
proposal for the transfer of assets of such corporation to another person in con-
sideration of the issuance of securities of such other person or [voting stock]
securities of a corporation [which is in control, as defined in section 368(c) of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954] which owns stock possessing at least 80 percent
of the total combined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote and at
least 80 percent of the total uamber of shares of all other classes of stock of such
other person, under such circumstances that the vote of a required favorable ma-
jority (1) will operate to authorize the proposed transaction so far as concerns the
corporation whose stockholders are voting (except for the taking of action by the
directors of the corporation involved and for compliance with such statutory pro-
visions as the filing of the plan or agreement with the appropriate State Authority),
and (2) will bind all stockholders of such corporation except to the extent that
dissenting stockholders may be entitled, under statutory provisions or provisions
contained in the certificate of incorporation, to receive the appraised or fair value
of their holdings.
3 This form of assets-for-securities transaction is called a "C" reorganization.
4 SEC Securities Act Release No. 3522, 19 Fed. Reg. 7128 (1954).
rSargent, supra note 1, at 84. The author was then a member of the Securities
and Exchange Commission. The SEC supported Mr. Sargent's assertion by implication
when it said, "[t]he amendment . .. arises from the fact that section 368(a)(1)(C)
of the Internal Revenue Code, which defines tax-free reorganizations, has just been
amended in a somewhat similar manner." SEC Securities Act Release No. 3522, 19
Fed. Reg. 7128 (1954).
6For example, rule 133 does not include "B" or "F" transactions which are in-
cluded in the Code. INTBRNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1954, §§ 368(a)(1)(B),(F) [here-
inafter cited as CODE]. On the other hand, rule 133 includes within its definition of
19681 1149
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19:1148
The current modifications mark the end of attempts to make
rule 133 reorganizations conform with nonrecognition transactions
of the Code.8 This is apparent from the fact that the new rule has
no reference to voting stock requirements, which are essential ele-
ments of section 368 transactions. Further, by deleting the allusion
to the Code definition of "control," the SEC has eliminated from
rule 133 all reference to the Code. Because of the old rule's refer-
ence to the Code, courts could reasonably restrict the rule according
to the judicial and administrative limitations which have been im-
posed on section 368 transactions.' Therefore, deletion of the Code
reference has made these limitations irrelevant to court or SEC in-
terpretation of the no-sale rule.
An immediately apparent problem with the rule modification
stems from the elimination of the reference to the Code. At one
time, the relation of section 368 to rule 133 caused great confusion
type-C transactions the exchange of the transferor's assets for any securities of the trans-
feree or voting stock of the transferee's parent, whereas CODE § 368(a)(1)(C) requires
the exchange to be solely for voting stock in either the transferee or its parent.
7 Accord, 1 L. Loss 528 n.229. The rationale is particularly obscure for the require-
ment in the 1954 version of rule 133 which allowed for the exchange of the corporate
assets for any securities of the transferee corporation, but permitted the exchange of corp-
orate assets only for voting stock of that corporation's parent. One author addressing
himself to this distinction said, "There seems to be no valid reason for this distinction and
the writer suspects that careless, borrowed-language drafting of the 1954 amendment
of Rule 133 is to blame for this restriction." Purcell, A Consideration of the No-Sale
Theory under the Securities Act of 1933, 24 BROOKLYN I. REv. 254, 274 (1958).
However valid that author's guess may be, in one context it is irrelevant. Regardless
of the Commission's motive for making the distinction, it has been made. Indeed, the
distinction has had the effect of fostering the connection to nonrecognition theory
under the Internal Revenue Code, subsequently requiring affirmative action by the
SEC to change that effect.
8 CODE § 36 8(a) defines all the nonrecognition transaction forms.
9 Judicial and administrative interpretations have limited CODE § 368 in two ways
which are relevant in the present context. First, certain restrictions have been placed
upon section 368 transactions which must be satisfied before gain or loss will be ig-
nored, even though the transaction conforms technically with the requirements of the
section. These restrictions, which relate to the basic policy assumptions of the non-
recognition rule, are discussed in notes 14-16 infra and accompanying text. Second,
the actual words defining "control" in CODE § 36 8(c) have been very strictly inter-
preted by the Internal Revenue Service. Section 368(c) requires that "at least 80 per-
cent of the total number of shares of all other [i.e., nonvoting] classes of stock of the
[subsidiary) corporation. ... be held by the parent. The IRS has ruled that this
means the parent corporation must own "at least 80 percent of the total number of
shares of each class of outstanding non-voting stock." Rev. Rul. 59-259, 1959-2 CuM.
BULL. 115, 116. In considering another requirement of section 3 6 8(c), that the parent
corporation must also own "at least 80 percent of the total combined voting power of
all classes of stock entitled to vote ....." the Service ruled that voting power means the
power to elect directors. Rev. Rul. 63-234, 1963-2 CuM. BULL. 148. Under this rea-
soning, if a corporation has 80 percent of the votes in the subsidiary, but because of
stock classifications it can only elect three of the four directors of the subsidiary, the
parent is not in control within the meaning of CODE § 368 (c).
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and led people to believe that gain need not be recognized for any
reorganization which met the rule 133 standards.Y The recent
modification can only aggravate whatever confusion may remain,
because by eliminating reference to section 368 in rule 133, the
Commission has destroyed a "warning flag" for those not highly
sophisticated in the tax as well as the securities aspects of "C" re-
organizations. The Commission tacitly recognized this problem in
its release accompanying the amended rule, which warned that even
though specific reference to section 368 has been deleted from rule
133, parties considering a reorganization under the no-sale theory
should be made aware that the requirements of section 368 must
also be met if gain is not to be recognized in the reorganization."
It is submitted that attorneys or other parties concerned with fitting
reorganizations into the no-sale rule will generally read Securities
Act rules, but not Securities Act releases. Once the rule modifica-
tion has been incorporated in the Code of Federal Regulations, the
warning may be lost in the collection of old, rarely referred to Fed-
eral Register volumes. While this is unquestionably a real prob-
lem, deletion of the "warning flag" is probably not a sufficient rea-
son to conclude that the rule 133 amendment was a mistake by the
Commission.
To evaluate other aspects of the rule 133 modifications, the pol-
icy assumptions behind the nonrecognition and the no-sale theories
must be explored. The Treasury regulations state the general rule
that gain or loss must be recognized if one piece of property is ex-
changed for another and if there is a material difference between
the two pieces of property. 2 The regulations then continue:
The purpose of the reorganization provisions of the Code is to ex-
cept from the general rule certain specifically described exchanges
incident to such readjustments of corporate structures made in one
of the particular ways specified in the Code, as are required by
business exigencies and which effect only a readjustment of con-
tinuing interest in property under modified corporate forms.' 3
To implement this purpose the Internal Revenue Service and the
courts have articulated three requirements, not explicitly stated in
section 368, which must be fulfilled for the gain or loss in a trans-
10 See Purcell, supra note 7, at 254.
11The Commission said, "The taxable nature of the transaction should, of course,
be fully disclosed to stockholders whose proxies or consents are solicited to the ap-
proval of the transaction." SEC Securities Act Release No. 4892, 33 Fed. Reg. 566
(1968).
12 Treas. Reg. 5 1.368-1(b) (1955).
3'3Id.
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action not to be recognized. The transaction must have been for a
"business purpose," 14 and there must be a "continuity of interest' 5
and a "continuity of enterprise"'" following the transaction.
Under the Securities Act, the SEC has no interest in gain or loss
recognition. The purpose of the Securities Act is to "provide frll
and fair disclosure of the character of the securities sold in inter-
state and foreign commerce and through the mails, and to prevent
frauds in the sale thereof . ". .. " The scope of the Act is generally
limited to "initial [and secondaryl distribution of securities rather
than subsequent trading."' 8  Thus, one policy assumption underly-
ing rule 133 is that the requirement for registration of securities
issued in a "no-sale" transaction will not further the purpose of
guaranteeing shareholders full and fair disclosure. 9 Although per-
haps beyond its express authority, at times the Commission has used
registration requirements to regulate corporations. 0 Hence, a sec-
14 The transaction must not have been a mere ploy to avoid taxes. See, e.g., Greg-
ory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
15 "[T]he transferor corporation or its shareholders [must retain] .. . a substantial
proprietary stake in the enterprise represented by a material interest in the affairs of
the transferee corporation, and . . . such retained interest [must represent] ...a sub-
stantial part of the value of the property transferred." Southwest Natural Gas Co. v.
Commissioner, 189 F.2d 332, 334 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 860 (1951). This
requirement is actually built into Code "C" reorganizations by the stipulation that the
assets must be exchanged almost exclusively for voting stock in the transferee or in
the parent, which in turn must be in very close control of the transferee.
16 "Such transactions and such acts must be an ordinary and necessary incident of
the conduct of the enterprise and must provide for the continuation of the enterprise."
Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(c) (1955).
17 Securities Act Preamble, 48 Stat. 74 (1933).
18 1 L. Loss 130.
19 Accord, letter from Edmund H. Worthy, supra note 2. Mr. Worthy said:
When the most recent amendment to this provision [rule 133] was adopted,
many more companies had become subject to the proxy rules and the scope
of the antifraud provisions of the securities laws had developed to the point
where failure to disclose the tax consequences would be more clearly action-
able. Id.
20The Commission has used its power to accelerate the effective date of registra-
tion-statement amendments in order to regulate corporations in some ways. The Com-
mission established a general rule that amendment effective dates would normally be
accelerated and identified certain types of situations in which acceleration would be
refused. Failure to have amendments accelerated indicates to the public that the SEC
does not approve of an issuer's conduct. Thus, the public is likely to react negatively
to the issuance when it finally goes on the market. This process serves as an effective
deterrent which keeps issuers from attempting to issue securities under a disfavored
situation as specified by the SEC. See 1 L. Loss 277-83. This administrative practice
was made more formal in a note added to Securities Act Rule 460. 17 C.F.R. S 230.460
(1968). Yet, it is important not to infer from this procedure that the SEC willingly
regulates corporations in all areas of the law. The Commission, with certain excep-




ond policy assumption must be either that there is no need to at-
tempt to regulate companies engaged in rule 133 transactions or
that, even if regulation were needed, requiring registration would
not adequately perform the regulatory function.
Whether the Code nonrecognition rule and the SEC no-sale rule
successfully implement their underlying policies can best be analyzed
in a factual context. Therefore, the following is a hypothetical situ-
ation in which the benefits of the rule modifications have been ex-
ploited."'
Sale of Assets by BCA, Inc. to 231, Inc. BCA, Inc. was a pub-
licly held corporation with assets worth $1,500,000 and 600 share-
holders of its over-the-counter stock. The president and a major
shareholder of BCA, Stephen Strait, planned to retire and complete-
ly relinquish management of the corporation. He hoped to con-
tinue to participate in BCA profits, but wanted his securities invest-
ment to have a preferred status which would guarantee him a regu-
lar income. Because management of BCA requires a working knowl-
edge of nuclear physics, Mr. Strait found no one within the organi-
zation capable of assuming management. For the same reason very
few corporations were competent to merge with BCA and properly
manage it.
Mr. Strait did discover one corporation able to take over and
continue BCA's management, 231, Inc., a recently formed subsidiary
of Octopus, Inc. The managements of 231 and Octopus and Mr.
Strait quietly discussed a sale of BCA's assets. They concluded (1)
that a sale of assets would be ideal; (2) that it would be impractical
for 231 to acquire BCA's assets for securities in 231, because 231's
newness to the field involved too much risk for Mr. Strait and the
other BCA shareholders; and (3) that 231 did not yet have the
capital which would be necessary to purchase BCA's assets outright.
The parties finally agreed to a plan whereby BCA would transfer
its assets to 231 in exchange for preferred nonvoting stock in Octo-
pus, Inc. This would give Mr. Strait the security he needed in his
investment and would avoid disrupting the voting power balance in
the Octopus management.
21 No actual cases have been found in which the no-sale rule has been examined,
with the possible exception of National Supply Co. v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ., 134
F.2d 689 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 773 (1943). The issues and facts of that
case are not relevant here. Further, "lilt is a most difficult stretch of legal reasoning
to conclude that the 'no-sale' theory was the basis for the court's decision in such case."
Sargent, supra note 1, at 86.
Attorneys recognize that it is in the best interest of clients to file a registration
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The proposal was submitted to a vote of the BCA shareholders.
The vote was by proxy and, pursuant to section 14 (a) of the Se-
curities Exchange Act of 193422 and rules promulgated thereunder,23
a complete disclosure of the arrangement was made available to the
public and given to the shareholders of record. The proposal was
adopted. Octopus issued the securities to BCA which in liquidating
exchanged them with its shareholders for their outstanding BCA stock.
Since this reorganization was effected after the recent Securities Act
rule 133 modifications had been promulgated, the shares were is-
sued without Octopus having the burden and expense of registering
the securities pursuant to section 5 of the Securities Act.24 This was
not a nonrecognition transaction for tax purposes, because it did not
meet the requirements of section 368 (a) (1) (C) of the Internal
Revenue Code. Each shareholder was required to recognize his gain
or loss from the transaction. 5
As readily seen from this hypothetical situation, more options
are now open to parties negotiating a "C" reorganization who wish
to keep the transaction within the aegis of rule 133. BCA share-
holders are not restricted to taking voting stock in Octopus. They
may choose to relinquish control in favor of guaranteeing income
from their assets. Octopus can execute the "C" transaction without
diluting the voting power of its current voting shareholders if it is
able to convince BCA shareholders to accept a guaranteed income in
lieu of a controlling voice in Octopus. Further, more corporations
are eligible to engage in the no-sale transaction. For example,
Octopus may own 80 percent of all nonvoting shares in 231, but not
80 percent of all nonvoting shares in each class of 231 stock and
still be a "controlling" corporation within the meaning of rule
133.26 Although Octopus may engage in the transaction with the
intent of having its subsidiary, 231, immediately sell or terminate
statement or to design a reorganization so that it is clearly within rule 133. Perhaps
this explains the dearth of cases testing the application of the rule.
22 15 U.S.C. S 78(n) (a) (1964) [hereinafter cited as Exchange Act]. This section,
requiring proxy statements, is applicable to all corporations whose securities are reg-
istered pursuant to Exchange Act 5 12, 15 U.S.C. § 78(1) (1964). BCA, with assets
of $1,500,000 and 600 shareholders of its over-the-counter stock, is required to register
by id. § 12(g)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78(l)(g)(1) (1964).
23 17 C.F.R. 5 240.14 a-1 to -12 (1968).
24 15 U.S.C. 5 77(e) (1964).
25 See CODE 5 1002.
26 If the Internal Revenue Service interpretations of CODE 5 368(c) were applicable
to section 368(c) as referred to in old rule 133, which they very likely would have been,
Octopus would not have been in "control" of 231. See note 9 supra.
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the BCA business, unregistered securities still may be issued in the
transaction.
Although the potential for abusing minority shareholders' in-
terests seems minimal under the new rule, the possibility is present.
Assume in the hypothetical that Octopus had used the new rule to
expand its operations by buying a controlling interest in BCA and
by using that interest to instigate a "C" reorganization with 231.
Under these circumstances, no one negotiating the reorganization
will protect the interests of the minority shareholders as did Mr.
Strait in the hypothetical. The minority shareholders will have a
right of redress under the securities laws if Octopus uses any mis-
representation or nondisclosure to bring about the reorganization
agreement."8 If the consideration to the minority shareholders is
dearly unfair, Octopus' position as a majority shareholder may make
it liable for breach of a fiduciary responsibility.2" Further, the fed-
eral class action procedure now makes it easier for minority share-
holders to sustain the cost of actions against a large corporation."0
Practically speaking, however, the difficulty and expense of rapidly
organizing a class action may be such as to deter many minority
shareholders from suing for remedies which they justly deserve.
This possibility of minority shareholders being injured without
2 7 The "continuity of enterprise" requirement of the CODE, see note 16 supra,
would probably have made this impossible under the old rule, assuming that rule was
affected by section 368 limitations.
2 8 As Mr. Worthy indicated, the civil liabilities for fraud and nondisclosure have
been greatly expanded in the last several years. Note 19 supra. Liability for misstate-
ments or nondisclosure in proxy statements pursuant to Exchange Act § 14 (a), 15
U.S.C. § 78(n)(a) (1964) or other statements by the management of a corporation or
its controlling shareholders may be found in various sections of the securities laws.
See, e.g., Securities Act § 12(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77(l)(2) (1964); Exchange Act § 18(a),
15 U.S.C. § 78(r)(a) (1964); Exchange Act Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1968),
pursuant to Exchange Act § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78(j)(b) (1964).
The liability can be very strict. For example, Exchange Act Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.10b-5 (1968), provides in part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of
any facility of any national securities exchange... to make any untrue state-
ment of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order
to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they
were made, not misleading,... in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security.
29 "All powers granted to a corporation and its directors and majority shareholders
are impliedly to be exercised by the directors or the shareholders or by both concur-
rently only in good faith and for legitimate purposes. They should be regarded in
some sense as fiduciaries." H. BALLANTIN, CORPORATrONS § 278, at 655 (rev. ed.
1946); see 19 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 1130, 1137 n.37 (1968).
30 FED. R. CV. P. 23 was amended in 1966 to greatly increase the usefulness of the
class actions device. See 19 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 1101 (1968).
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compensation is not a function of the rule change. Even if the old
rule were still in effect, Octopus could instigate the same transaction.
The only difference would be that the securities issued to the BCA
shareholders would have to be voting stock or registered nonvoting
securities. If Octopus were large enough and if the voting stock
were placed in a class with limited voting power, the transaction
could easily be effected without endangering the domination of
Octopus management by the currently controlling Octopus share-
holders. If securities other than voting stock were given and regis-
tered, the minority shareholders would have no greater opportunity
to redress their grievances than they would have if the securities
were not registered. Misrepresentation or nondisclosure remedies
are much the same if the untruthful statements are made in registra-
tion of securities"' or in proxy statements.3 " A proxy statement
would have been required when the BCA shareholders were asked
to vote on the reorganization plan."3
In one way requiring registration might be used to avoid this
abuse. If the Commission were to require registration and selective-
ly employ delaying tactics to defeat a registration, it could indirectly
regulate those corporations which unfairly treated transferor corpo-
ration minority shareholders.3 4 Transferee corporations could easily
circumvent this regulation by issuing voting stock. Thus, the Com-
mission would have to abolish much of the no-sale rule in order to
effectively use registration to regulate "C" reorganizations. No evi-
dence is available to make a convincing case that such regulation is
needed. Further, it is highly doubtful that the Commission should
take such drastic action to perform a purpose which is not in its
statutory mandate.3 5
The hypothetical use of new rule 133 and the analysis of its ad-
vantages and problems points to a vindication of both the Code non-
recognition concept and the SEC no-sale rule even though they now
permit significantly different transactions. The nonrecognition rule
is applied to corporate reorganizations "which effect only a read-
justment of continuing interest in property under modified corpo-
rate forms."3 6  The situation where Mr. Strait and the BCA share-
31 Pursuant to Securities Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77(e) (1964).
3 2 Pursuant to Exchange Act § 14(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78(n)(2) (1964).
33 See text accompanying notes 22 and 23 supra.
34 The use of registration requirements to regulate corporations is not foreign to
the Commission. See note 20 supra.
35 See Securities Act Preamble, 48 Stat. 74 (1933).
3 6 Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(b) (1955). For a more thorough discussion of the non-
recognition policies, see text accompanying notes 12-16 supra.
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holders are relinquishing all management control of their corporate
assets in exchange for preferred nonvoting securities is not within
the purpose of the Code nonrecognition rule. Gain should be recog-
nized. In this same situation, virtually all information which can
be used to protect shareholders from misrepresentation or nondis-
closure is already required. No useful purpose would be served by
requiring registration of the securities issued pursuant to the trans-
action. If there is a need to regulate corporations involved in these
transactions, it is doubtful that a mere registration requirement
would help perform that function.
The rule modification has not gone too far. The next question
is whether it goes far enough. While reference to section 368 (c)
of the Internal Revenue Code has been deleted, the requirements of
that subsection are still imposed upon rule 133."7 One demand of
the Code nonrecognition rule is that the transferor corporation or
its shareholders have a continuing interest in the assets which are
transferred."8 This continuity cannot occur where the transferor re-
ceives voting stock in the parent corporation of the transferee unless
the parent has a close control over its subsidiary-transferee. The
section 368 (c) requirements are integral elements in the chain of
continuity. But, "continuity of interest" is unnecessary to the Se-
curities Act. The transferor's having a continuing interest in its as-
sets is irrelevant to whether full and fair disclosure of facts relating
to the securities issued in a "C" transaction has been achieved." The
SEC impliedly recognizes this by not requiring that the exchange of
assets be for voting stock. Unless the transferor has voting stock
in the transferee or its parent, the transferor has no managerial pow-
er over its assets and the continuity of interest chain is broken.
Absent a continuity of interest requirement, no reason for the
80 percent requirement appears. Returning to the hypothetical, if
Octopus, Inc. had had no control over 231, no less information
would be available to the BCA shareholders than was available un-
3 7 For the precise wording of that requirement, see note 2 supra.
3 8 See note 15 supra.
3 9 Rule 133(b)-(f) is a form of continuity of interest requirement. The transferor
cannot take securities from the transferee with the intent of selling them publicly. Al-
lowing such a transaction would make it possible to sell the securities to a public which
has no access to full information about the issuance, since no proxy statement would
be involved. This "continuity of interest" requirement is the inverse of the require-
ment in CoDE § 368. The Code requires that the transferor have voting stock control
over its assets. The transferor may at any time sell that stock and will then have to
recognize gain. Under rule 133(b)-(f) it is irrelevant that the transferor may not
have voting stock control over its assets, but the transferor must hold whatever securities
it does receive as an investment.
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der the other circumstances. If Octopus did not substantially own
231, Octopus could not properly issue shares to BCA shareholders
unless Octopus' assets were increased by adequate consideration,
probably from 231. To do so would be a breach of the trust rela-
tion with Octopus shareholders. However, this does not involve
full and fair disclosure problems, and the problems which are cre-
ated are adequately solved by the general law of corporations."' Re-
quiring registration would have the same result as it did when Octo-
pus was in control of 231. No significant additional protection
from fraud and nondisclosure would be added. Therefore, since the
80 percent requirement is a restriction which does nothing to pro-
mote fall and fair disclosure, the SEC should eliminate control
requirements from rule 133.
DAVID J. NEWBURGER
40 Corporate management generally has a statutory obligation to issue par shares
for at least par value and no-par shares for at least some valuable consideration. See,
e.g., ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 17 (1960). A further management
duty to issue the shares for a reasonable consideration can be inferred from the duty to
exercise reasonable care, see H. HENN, CORPORATIONS § 235 (1961); N. LATrIN,
CORPORATIONS 241 (1959), the duty to be loyal to the interests of the corporation,
see H. HENN, supra § 239, and the duty not to oppress minority shareholders, see id.
§ 241.
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